On the consistency of relative facts

On the consistency of relative facts

Eric G. Cavalcanti, Andrea Di Biagio, Carlo Rovelli
The Centre de Physique Théorique – UMR 7332 – CNRS and Aix-Marseille Université and Université de Toulon & The University of Western Ontario and Rotman Institute for Philosophy & Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics

Preprint

ABSTRACT

Lawrence et al. have presented an argument purporting to show that ``relative facts do not exist'' and, consequently, ``Relational Quantum Mechanics is incompatible with quantum mechanics''. The argument is based on a GHZ-like contradiction between constraints satisfied by measurement outcomes in an extended Wigner's friend scenario. Here we present a strengthened version of the argument, and show why, contrary to the claim by Lawrence et al., these arguments do not contradict the consistency of a theory of relative facts. Rather, considering this argument helps clarify how one should not think about a theory of relative facts, like RQM.